log

1. 012 2026-09-17 KMIP vs PKCS#11: the difference is whose code runs in your process Every network HSM ships a closed PKCS#11 library that runs inside your application. KMIP is TLS and an encoding you can write yourself. What that buys, and what it does not.
2. 011 2026-09-13 The FIPS tamper seal is a sticker, and applying it is your job Most FIPS 140 level 2 hardware ships with the seals in a bag. What the lab tests on a tamper-evident label, and what sixty security policies leave to the operator.
3. 010 2026-09-12 Segregated crypto in a custodian bankruptcy still needs a key that works Art. 242a SchKG lets clients claim crypto out of a bankrupt Swiss custodian's estate. The claim only works if the estate can still sign, and nobody tests it.
4. 009 2026-09-10 FIPS 140-2 vs 140-3: what actually changed A FIPS 140-2 certificate issued on 31 July 2026 expires on 21 September. What 140-3 changed on paper, and what 778 certificates say changed in practice.
5. 008 2026-09-01 FIPS 140-3 levels 1 to 4: what each level actually requires Level 1 is software, Level 3 is the HSM tier, Level 4 is empty: none of 773 FIPS 140-3 certificates as of September 2026. What each level actually requires.
6. 007 2026-08-19 The ECDSA tax: GG20, CGGMP21, DKLs23 and FROST compared Same library, same machine: FROST signs in 3 ms, threshold ECDSA in 5 s. Why, and what GG20, CGGMP21, DKLs23 and FROST pay for it. Who ships them, which broke.
7. 006 2026-08-15 The key that never exists: a threshold signing ceremony in your browser interactive Three keyholders run a real 2-of-3 key generation and FROST signing session on this page, every message shown byte for byte. Zig to WebAssembly, no server.
8. 005 2026-08-05 FIPS 140-3 is not a security guarantee, and auditors know it Validated modules shipped ROCA, EUCLEAK and a YubiKey flaw caused by FIPS self-tests. What the certificate attests, what FIPS mode costs, where auditors look.
9. 004 2026-08-02 Coldcard's seed bug: the right RNG was in every binary, never called A five-year Coldcard firmware bug cut seed entropy from 128 bits to about 40. Why no audit could catch it afterwards, and what it means for anyone making keys.
10. 003 2026-06-12 Fireblocks Recovery Utility: what verify mode proves How the Fireblocks Recovery Utility verifies a backup kit step by step, what a green Verified! proves, and the three things it takes on trust.
11. 002 2026-06-05 DORA exit plan for crypto custody: the test is whether you can sign DORA Article 28(8) wants a documented, tested exit plan for every critical ICT provider. For MPC custody the exit is signing capability, not data.
12. 001 2026-05-29 A custody recovery drill that never exposes a key A recovery drill for MPC custody produces four numbers and a deviation log, and touches no private key. Most of what it finds is not cryptography.