<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>808bits</title><link>https://808bits.com/</link><description>808bits. 101 bytes. The quiet infrastructure of trustless systems: notes on keys, proofs, and continuity.</description><language>en</language><atom:link href="https://808bits.com/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>KMIP vs PKCS#11: the difference is whose code runs in your process</title><link>https://808bits.com/articles/kmip-vs-pkcs11/</link><guid>https://808bits.com/articles/kmip-vs-pkcs11/</guid><pubDate>Thu, 17 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><description>Every network HSM ships a closed PKCS#11 library that runs inside your application. KMIP is TLS and an encoding you can write yourself. What that buys, and what it does not.</description></item><item><title>The FIPS tamper seal is a sticker, and applying it is your job</title><link>https://808bits.com/articles/fips-tamper-evident-seals/</link><guid>https://808bits.com/articles/fips-tamper-evident-seals/</guid><pubDate>Sun, 13 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><description>Most FIPS 140 level 2 hardware ships with the seals in a bag. What the lab tests on a tamper-evident label, and what sixty security policies leave to the operator.</description></item><item><title>Segregated crypto in a custodian bankruptcy still needs a key that works</title><link>https://808bits.com/articles/crypto-segregation-bankruptcy-keys/</link><guid>https://808bits.com/articles/crypto-segregation-bankruptcy-keys/</guid><pubDate>Sat, 12 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><description>Art. 242a SchKG lets clients claim crypto out of a bankrupt Swiss custodian's estate. The claim only works if the estate can still sign, and nobody tests it.</description></item><item><title>FIPS 140-2 vs 140-3: what actually changed</title><link>https://808bits.com/articles/fips-140-2-vs-140-3-what-changed/</link><guid>https://808bits.com/articles/fips-140-2-vs-140-3-what-changed/</guid><pubDate>Thu, 10 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><description>A FIPS 140-2 certificate issued on 31 July 2026 expires on 21 September. What 140-3 changed on paper, and what 778 certificates say changed in practice.</description></item><item><title>TPM 2.0 playground</title><link>https://808bits.com/tools/tpm2-playground/</link><guid>https://808bits.com/tools/tpm2-playground/</guid><pubDate>Tue, 01 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><description>A real TPM 2.0 command interface in your browser: the Microsoft reference implementation compiled to WebAssembly. Send commands, read every annotated byte, seal a secret to a boot state and watch tampering destroy it. No server.</description></item><item><title>FIPS 140-3 levels 1 to 4: what each level actually requires</title><link>https://808bits.com/articles/fips-140-3-levels-explained/</link><guid>https://808bits.com/articles/fips-140-3-levels-explained/</guid><pubDate>Tue, 01 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><description>Level 1 is software, Level 3 is the HSM tier, Level 4 is empty: none of 773 FIPS 140-3 certificates as of September 2026. What each level actually requires.</description></item><item><title>Raw transaction decoder</title><link>https://808bits.com/tools/raw-transaction-decoder/</link><guid>https://808bits.com/tools/raw-transaction-decoder/</guid><pubDate>Thu, 20 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><description>Paste a raw transaction from Bitcoin, Ethereum, Solana, Cosmos, NEAR, Tron, TON, Cardano, Sui or Tezos and see every byte named: scripts disassembled, addresses derived, senders recovered from signatures. Zig compiled to WebAssembly, no server.</description></item><item><title>The ECDSA tax: GG20, CGGMP21, DKLs23 and FROST compared</title><link>https://808bits.com/articles/the-ecdsa-tax/</link><guid>https://808bits.com/articles/the-ecdsa-tax/</guid><pubDate>Wed, 19 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><description>Same library, same machine: FROST signs in 3 ms, threshold ECDSA in 5 s. Why, and what GG20, CGGMP21, DKLs23 and FROST pay for it. Who ships them, which broke.</description></item><item><title>The key that never exists: a threshold signing ceremony in your browser</title><link>https://808bits.com/articles/threshold-signing-ceremony-in-your-browser/</link><guid>https://808bits.com/articles/threshold-signing-ceremony-in-your-browser/</guid><pubDate>Sat, 15 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><description>Three keyholders run a real 2-of-3 key generation and FROST signing session on this page, every message shown byte for byte. Zig to WebAssembly, no server.</description></item><item><title>FIPS 140-3 is not a security guarantee, and auditors know it</title><link>https://808bits.com/articles/fips-140-3-not-a-security-guarantee/</link><guid>https://808bits.com/articles/fips-140-3-not-a-security-guarantee/</guid><pubDate>Wed, 05 Aug 2026 00:16:08 +0000</pubDate><description>Validated modules shipped ROCA, EUCLEAK and a YubiKey flaw caused by FIPS self-tests. What the certificate attests, what FIPS mode costs, where auditors look.</description></item><item><title>Coldcard's seed bug: the right RNG was in every binary, never called</title><link>https://808bits.com/articles/coldcard-entropy-failure-lessons/</link><guid>https://808bits.com/articles/coldcard-entropy-failure-lessons/</guid><pubDate>Sun, 02 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><description>A five-year Coldcard firmware bug cut seed entropy from 128 bits to about 40. Why no audit could catch it afterwards, and what it means for anyone making keys.</description></item><item><title>Fireblocks Recovery Utility: what verify mode proves</title><link>https://808bits.com/articles/fireblocks-recovery-tool-what-it-proves/</link><guid>https://808bits.com/articles/fireblocks-recovery-tool-what-it-proves/</guid><pubDate>Fri, 12 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><description>How the Fireblocks Recovery Utility verifies a backup kit step by step, what a green Verified! proves, and the three things it takes on trust.</description></item><item><title>DORA exit plan for crypto custody: the test is whether you can sign</title><link>https://808bits.com/articles/dora-exit-plan-digital-asset-custody/</link><guid>https://808bits.com/articles/dora-exit-plan-digital-asset-custody/</guid><pubDate>Fri, 05 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><description>DORA Article 28(8) wants a documented, tested exit plan for every critical ICT provider. For MPC custody the exit is signing capability, not data.</description></item><item><title>A custody recovery drill that never exposes a key</title><link>https://808bits.com/articles/custody-key-recovery-drill/</link><guid>https://808bits.com/articles/custody-key-recovery-drill/</guid><pubDate>Fri, 29 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><description>A recovery drill for MPC custody produces four numbers and a deviation log, and touches no private key. Most of what it finds is not cryptography.</description></item></channel></rss>