# 808bits > Notes on keys, proofs and continuity: cryptographic key custody, key > ceremonies, and FIPS 140 validation, written from first-hand work rather > than restated from vendor documentation. Articles are short and specific, and the longer working notes behind them are not published. The FIPS section is a tracker over NIST's Cryptographic Module Validation Program lists, covering 5,552 certificate validations as of 2026-10-21, with a status-change timeline this site derives by diffing its own snapshots. NIST does not date those moves, so that timeline exists nowhere else. ## Articles - [KMIP vs PKCS#11: the difference is whose code runs in your process](https://808bits.com/articles/kmip-vs-pkcs11/): Every network HSM ships a closed PKCS#11 library that runs inside your application. KMIP is TLS and an encoding you can write yourself. What that buys, and what it does not. - [The FIPS tamper seal is a sticker, and applying it is your job](https://808bits.com/articles/fips-tamper-evident-seals/): Most FIPS 140 level 2 hardware ships with the seals in a bag. What the lab tests on a tamper-evident label, and what sixty security policies leave to the operator. - [Segregated crypto in a custodian bankruptcy still needs a key that works](https://808bits.com/articles/crypto-segregation-bankruptcy-keys/): Art. 242a SchKG lets clients claim crypto out of a bankrupt Swiss custodian's estate. The claim only works if the estate can still sign, and nobody tests it. - [FIPS 140-2 vs 140-3: what actually changed](https://808bits.com/articles/fips-140-2-vs-140-3-what-changed/): A FIPS 140-2 certificate issued on 31 July 2026 expires on 21 September. What 140-3 changed on paper, and what 778 certificates say changed in practice. - [FIPS 140-3 levels 1 to 4: what each level actually requires](https://808bits.com/articles/fips-140-3-levels-explained/): Level 1 is software, Level 3 is the HSM tier, Level 4 is empty: none of 773 FIPS 140-3 certificates as of September 2026. What each level actually requires. - [The ECDSA tax: GG20, CGGMP21, DKLs23 and FROST compared](https://808bits.com/articles/the-ecdsa-tax/): Same library, same machine: FROST signs in 3 ms, threshold ECDSA in 5 s. Why, and what GG20, CGGMP21, DKLs23 and FROST pay for it. Who ships them, which broke. - [The key that never exists: a threshold signing ceremony in your browser](https://808bits.com/articles/threshold-signing-ceremony-in-your-browser/): Three keyholders run a real 2-of-3 key generation and FROST signing session on this page, every message shown byte for byte. Zig to WebAssembly, no server. - [FIPS 140-3 is not a security guarantee, and auditors know it](https://808bits.com/articles/fips-140-3-not-a-security-guarantee/): Validated modules shipped ROCA, EUCLEAK and a YubiKey flaw caused by FIPS self-tests. What the certificate attests, what FIPS mode costs, where auditors look. - [Coldcard's seed bug: the right RNG was in every binary, never called](https://808bits.com/articles/coldcard-entropy-failure-lessons/): A five-year Coldcard firmware bug cut seed entropy from 128 bits to about 40. Why no audit could catch it afterwards, and what it means for anyone making keys. - [Fireblocks Recovery Utility: what verify mode proves](https://808bits.com/articles/fireblocks-recovery-tool-what-it-proves/): How the Fireblocks Recovery Utility verifies a backup kit step by step, what a green Verified! proves, and the three things it takes on trust. - [DORA exit plan for crypto custody: the test is whether you can sign](https://808bits.com/articles/dora-exit-plan-digital-asset-custody/): DORA Article 28(8) wants a documented, tested exit plan for every critical ICT provider. For MPC custody the exit is signing capability, not data. - [A custody recovery drill that never exposes a key](https://808bits.com/articles/custody-key-recovery-drill/): A recovery drill for MPC custody produces four numbers and a deviation log, and touches no private key. Most of what it finds is not cryptography. ## Tools Browser-based, no upload, nothing leaves the page. - [Raw transaction decoder](https://808bits.com/tools/raw-transaction-decoder/): Paste a raw transaction from Bitcoin, Ethereum, Solana, Cosmos, NEAR, Tron, TON, Cardano, Sui or Tezos and see every byte named: scripts disassembled, addresses derived, senders recovered from signatures. Zig compiled to WebAssembly, no server. - [TPM 2.0 playground](https://808bits.com/tools/tpm2-playground/): A real TPM 2.0 command interface in your browser: the Microsoft reference implementation compiled to WebAssembly. Send commands, read every annotated byte, seal a secret to a boot state and watch tampering destroy it. No server. ## FIPS 140 certificate tracker - [Certificate tracker](https://808bits.com/fips/): index and search over all 5,552 certificates, 739 of them active - [The FIPS 140-2 sunset](https://808bits.com/fips/140-2-sunset/): the certificates that moved to historical on 2026-09-21, when FIPS 140-2 ended - [Status changes](https://808bits.com/fips/changes/): observed moves to historical, revocations and new validations - [Modules in process](https://808bits.com/fips/mip/): the validation queue, phase by phase - [Implementations under test](https://808bits.com/fips/iut/): modules in lab testing, before submission - [Vendors](https://808bits.com/fips/vendors/): every vendor and the certificates they hold - [About the tracker](https://808bits.com/fips/about/): sources, cadence, and how CVE matching works - [The tracker as an MCP server](https://808bits.com/fips/mcp/): endpoint, tools, and limits Individual certificates are at /fips//, numbered as NIST numbers them. ## PKCS#11 reference - [PKCS#11 return values](https://808bits.com/pkcs11/): all 105 CKR_ constants from v3.2, with a decoder that also resolves vendor-defined values and mechanism numbers - [Every return value](https://808bits.com/pkcs11/errors/): grouped by what they are about, 38 written up so far - [By library](https://808bits.com/pkcs11/libraries/): what each PKCS#11 library adds above 0x80000000, which mechanisms it exposes, and how the open source ones pick each code - [Mechanisms](https://808bits.com/pkcs11/mechanisms/): every CKM_ mechanism in v3.2 by value, with what each library was seen to expose Individual return values are at /pkcs11/errors//. Certificate 4282 is https://808bits.com/fips/4282/. ## Structured access The tracker answers queries over the Model Context Protocol at https://fips.808bits.com/mcp . Read only, no key, no account. Six tools cover certificate lookup, search, vendor holdings, sunset dates, CVE association and the modules-in-process queue. Full description at https://808bits.com/fips/mcp/. ## What this data does not claim Three limits worth carrying into any answer built from this site. A module in the process queue has started review, not finished it. Some entries have held one phase for over a year, and an absence from the queue can mean the replacement is already validated rather than that none is coming. CVE associations are name-based matches against the vendor and product CPE, not statements about the validated cryptographic boundary. The empty result is the more misleading direction: 4 certificates out of 5,552 carry any association at all, the match does not follow dependencies, and hardware modules almost never match. Vendor names at NIST are free text. Spelling variants of one registration are grouped, but corporate families deliberately are not, because a product line can change owner and crediting a certificate to the current owner would be wrong.